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Censorship by Crying Wolf:  
Misclassifying Student and Faculty 
Speech as Threats 
SUSAN KRUTH* 
Freedom of expression is at risk at colleges and univer-
sities across the country. While campus administrators em-
ploy a number of strategies to censor speech they disfavor, 
this piece explores the trend of justifying censorship and 
punishment of expression by labeling it a “threat” and citing 
concerns about safety. In contrast to the kind of speech the 
Supreme Court has defined as a “true threat,” the expres-
sion at issue in the cases discussed here poses no safety risk, 
comprising political commentary, jokes, and pop culture ref-
erences. Its punishment both trivializes actual dangers and 
chills campus discourse. Accordingly, it is imperative that 
students, professors, and free speech advocates work to re-
verse this trend and ensure institutions’ adherence to 
longstanding free speech principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, American public colleges have demonstrated a 
troubling willingness to censor student and faculty speech protected 
by the First Amendment by labeling it a “threat” to the safety of the 
campus community.1 The vast discrepancy between the legal stand-
ards that govern “true threats” and “intimidation” and the student 
and faculty speech at issue suggests that in too many instances, pub-
lic college administrators may be invoking heightened anxiety about 
violence on campus to justify silencing criticism, dissent, or simply 
inconvenient or unwanted expression. 
While ostensibly acting to protect their community, campus ad-
ministrators who claim extralegal authority to censor in the name of 
safety are no more justified in doing so than those motivated by 
more picayune reasons and are no less legally and morally culpable. 
Indeed, given the democratic and social importance of protecting 
freedom of expression in academia,2 campus censorship driven by a 
                                                                                                             
 1 See infra Part II. 
 2 The Supreme Court cast the essentiality of free inquiry and expression on 
campus in unequivocal terms in Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 
(1957) (“The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities 
is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy 
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket 
upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the 
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misguided or pretextual assessment of the “threat” presented by pro-
tected student or faculty speech is particularly harmful. To avoid 
chilling campus speech, trivializing real threats, and teaching a gen-
eration of students the wrong lesson about the necessary balance be-
tween civil liberties and safety, American college administrators 
must reacquaint themselves with the narrow application of the true 
threat exception and respond to unwanted or disagreeable speech 
with common sense and principle. 
I. DEFINING “THREATS” 
In American jurisprudence, the comparatively broad protection 
afforded to speech by the First Amendment has certain limited ex-
ceptions, including “true threats” and “intimidation.”3 In Virginia v. 
Black, the Supreme Court of the United States defined “true threats” 
as “those statements where the speaker means to communicate a se-
rious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence 
to a particular individual or group of individuals.”4 
In Black, the Court was careful to distinguish true threats from 
protected speech like the “political hyperbole” at issue in Watts v. 
United States.5 The Court also made clear in Black that the speaker 
“need not actually intend to carry out the threat” in order for the 
speech at issue to lose First Amendment protection.6 The Court rea-
soned that the speaker’s intent to fulfill the threat was less signifi-
cant than the speaker’s intent to communicate the threat because of 
the harm inflicted by the communication itself, reasoning that “a 
prohibition on true threats ‘protect[s] individuals from the fear of 
violence’ and ‘from the disruption that fear engenders,’ in addition 
to protecting people ‘from the possibility that the threatened vio-
lence will occur.’”7 In defining “intimidation” as “a type of true 
                                                                                                             
future of our Nation. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, 
to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our 
civilization will stagnate and die.”). 
 3 Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358–60 (2003). 
 4 Id. at 359. 
 5 Id. In Watts, the Court found that an anti-war comment uttered at a political 
rally—“If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights 
is L. B. J.”—was protected by the First Amendment. See Watts v. United States, 
394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam). 
 6 Black, 538 U.S. at 360. 
 7 Id. 
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threat, where a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of per-
sons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or 
death,” the Court similarly seemed to place primary focus not on the 
speaker’s intent to actually commit an act of violence, but rather on 
the speaker’s intent to instill the fear of such an act in the victim.8 
The Court demonstrated the limits of the “true threats” and “in-
timidation” exceptions in Black, a case involving prosecutions under 
a Virginia statute that declared any cross burning in public or on 
another person’s property to be “prima facie evidence of an intent to 
intimidate a person or group of persons.”9 While acknowledging that 
“when a cross burning is used to intimidate, few if any messages are 
more powerful,”10 the Court struck down the statute’s prima facie 
provision because it failed to account for the potentially transform-
ative differences of intent presented by various instances of cross 
burning.11 For example, the Virginia statute’s prima facie provision 
effectively criminalized burning a cross for a stage production and 
also forbade Ku Klux Klan members from burning the cross at their 
rallies to communicate a message of solidarity, despite the lack of 
an intent to threaten others with either form of cross burning.12 By 
denying prosecutors and judges the ability to consider the context 
and purpose of each individual act, the provision threatened pro-
tected expression because it “ignore[d] all of the contextual factors 
that are necessary to decide whether a particular cross burning is 
intended to intimidate.”13 The Court concluded that this flaw 
“chill[ed] constitutionally protected political speech because of the 
possibility that a State will prosecute—and potentially convict—
somebody engaging only in lawful political speech at the core of 
what the First Amendment is designed to protect.”14 
Following Black, however, federal appellate courts have reached 
different conclusions about whether laws prohibiting threats must 
require a speaker to possess a subjective intent to threaten. The 
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits 
                                                                                                             
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 347–48. 
 10 Id. at 357. 
 11 Id. at 364–65. 
 12 Id. at 365–66. 
 13 Id. at 367. 
 14 Id. at 365. 
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each found that Black does not mandate such a requirement.15 The 
Ninth Circuit, however, reached the opposite conclusion, holding in 
United States v. Cassel that “only intentional threats are criminally 
punishable consistently with the First Amendment.”16 The Ninth 
Circuit also observed in a later case, United States v. Bagdasarian, 
that “[a] statement that the speaker does not intend as a threat is af-
forded constitutional protection and cannot be held criminal.”17 
A recent case appeared to present the Supreme Court with the 
opportunity to address and resolve the conflict over Black’s require-
ments. In Elonis v. United States,18 the Supreme Court considered 
the conviction of a man found guilty of making threats against his 
ex-wife and others under a federal statute criminalizing the trans-
mission of “any communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of another” in interstate 
commerce.19 On appeal, petitioner Anthony Douglas Elonis argued 
that the Government failed to prove that he intended the Facebook 
posts at issue to communicate a threat; in turn, the Government ar-
gued that no such showing was necessary.20 In reversing Elonis’ 
conviction, the Court’s majority, led by Chief Justice John Roberts, 
rested its conclusion on the fact that Elonis was found guilty on a 
jury instruction “premised solely on how his posts would be under-
stood by a reasonable person”: 
                                                                                                             
 15 See United States v. Elonis, 730 F.3d 321, 332 (3d Cir. 2013), rev’d, 135 
S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (“Black does not say that the true threats exception requires a 
subjective intent to threaten.”); United States v. White, 670 F.3d 498, 508 (4th 
Cir. 2012) (“A careful reading . . . does not, in our opinion, lead to the conclusion 
that Black introduced a specific-intent-to-threaten requirement . . . .”); United 
States v. Jeffries, 692 F.3d 473, 479–80 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[Black] says nothing 
about imposing a subjective standard on other threat-prohibiting statutes, and in-
deed had no occasion to do so: the Virginia law itself required subjective ‘intent.’ 
The problem in Black thus did not turn on subjective versus objective standards 
for construing threats. It turned on overbreadth—that the statute lacked any stand-
ard at all.”); United States v. Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 332 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[W]e 
have adopted an objective test for determining whether a communication is a true 
threat. This objective test, which has been applied repeatedly since Black, does 
not consider the subjective intent of the speaker.”). 
 16 United States v. Cassel, 408 F.3d 622, 631 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 17 United States v. Bagdasarian, 652 F.3d 1113, 1122 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 18 Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2007 (2015). 
 19 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). 
 20 Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2008. 
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The jury was instructed that the Government need 
prove only that a reasonable person would regard 
Elonis’s communications as threats, and that was er-
ror. Federal criminal liability generally does not turn 
solely on the results of an act without considering the 
defendant’s mental state. That understanding “took 
deep and early root in American soil” and Congress 
left it intact here: Under Section 875(c), “wrongdo-
ing must be conscious to be criminal.”21 
The Court’s decision left the question of whether a showing of 
recklessness is sufficient to support a conviction under the statute 
unresolved, and thus the First Amendment issues implicated by the 
criminalization of threats persist.22 
Despite the continuing uncertainty following Elonis, the Court’s 
decision confirmed that the federal threat statute at issue “is satisfied 
if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of issu-
ing a threat, or with knowledge that the communication will be 
viewed as a threat.”23 And other decisions regarding allegedly 
threatening expression prior to Black provide further illustration of 
the contours of the true threat exception and the relevant factors in 
ascertaining the limits of First Amendment protection. 
In Watts, for example, the Court paid particular attention to the 
context in which the anti-war comment was made and evaluated it 
by reference to related commentary.24 Noting that the “[t]he lan-
guage of the political arena . . . is often vituperative, abusive, and 
inexact,” the Court concluded that “[t]aken in context,” the com-
ment was simply “‘a kind of very crude offensive method of stating 
a political opposition to the President.’”25 The Court even granted 
weight to the “expressly conditional nature” of the speaker’s formu-
lation (if he was ever made to carry a rifle, [then] he would target 
the President), as well as the reaction of those around him.26 
                                                                                                             
 21 Id. at 2011–12 (citation omitted). 
 22 Id. at 2012. 
 23 Id. 
 24 See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam). 
 25 Id. at 708 (approving the speaker’s own characterization of his comment). 
 26 Id. 
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In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, the Court observed that a 
state court order prohibiting anti-abortion protesters from approach-
ing an abortion clinic impermissibly burdened free expression in the 
absence of evidence “that the protesters’ speech is independently 
proscribable (i.e., ‘fighting words’ or threats), or is so infused with 
violence as to be indistinguishable from a threat of physical harm.”27 
The question of how to determine whether speech was sufficiently 
“infused with violence” to justify the provision was not explored, 
but the Madsen Court indicated that the expression in question must 
be more than the simply “insulting, and even outrageous, speech” 
that the First Amendment protects.28 
In sum, Black’s formulations remain definitive for determining 
when otherwise protected expression may be prohibited as a “true 
threat” or intimidation. 
II. CENSORSHIP BY CRYING WOLF: MISCLASSIFYING STUDENT AND 
FACULTY SPEECH AS THREATS 
Public college administrators consistently silence protected stu-
dent and faculty speech by misclassifying expression both inside 
and outside of the classroom as actionable “threats.” The examples 
discussed in detail below are representative of the range of campus 
censorship of speech as “threats” reported to the Foundation for In-
dividual Rights in Education (“FIRE”), a nonpartisan, nonprofit or-
ganization dedicated to defending student and faculty civil liberties 
on American campuses. 
Seemingly motivated by differing impulses—the desire to quiet 
a persistent student or faculty critic, or to simply avoid negative pub-
licity or controversy—each example involves investigation or pun-
ishment of plainly protected speech that fails to rise anywhere near 
the standards for true threats and intimidation announced by the Su-
preme Court in Black. 
While it is axiomatic that anecdotes do not constitute data, 
FIRE’s case archives nevertheless demonstrate that the abuse of the 
true threats doctrine by administrators at public colleges is a persis-
tent phenomenon.29 Given the repeated documented instances of 
                                                                                                             
 27 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 774 (1994). 
 28 Id. (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322 (1988)). 
 29 See generally FIRE’s case archives, available at https://www.thefire.org/
cases/?limit=all. 
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campus speech misclassified as threats, and the fact that FIRE’s 
awareness of such instances is necessarily limited to those reported 
by the victims or the media, it is reasonable to estimate that more 
such abuses simply go unreported. 
A. Hayden Barnes, Valdosta State University 
In the Spring of 2007, former Valdosta State University 
(“VSU”) student Hayden Barnes was expelled for posting a satirical, 
cut-and-paste collage on his personal Facebook page that was 
deemed a threat by the university president.30 The collage criticized 
former VSU President Ronald Zaccari’s plan to spend $30 million 
dollars’ worth of student fees to construct parking garages on cam-
pus.31 
Barnes was a vocal critic of the parking deck’s construction in 
the months prior to his expulsion in May 2007.32 He registered his 
opposition in a variety of ways, posting flyers and sending emails to 
Zaccari, the student newspaper, student and faculty government, and 
the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia.33 Barnes 
proposed that Zaccari spend the money earmarked for the parking 
garage on what he perceived to be more environmentally friendly 
measures.34 Angered by Barnes’ persistent criticism, and embar-
rassed to have been contacted about Barnes’ communications by 
members of the Board of Regents, Zaccari summoned Barnes to a 
meeting in his office.35 Zaccari lambasted Barnes, telling him he 
“could not forgive” him and asking him, “Who do you think you 
are?”36 Despite the admonishment, Barnes continued to advocate 
against the parking garage.37 In response, Zaccari redoubled his ef-
forts to silence Barnes.38 Zaccari monitored Barnes’ personal Face-
                                                                                                             
 30 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, Barnes 
v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295 (2012) (No. 1-08-cv-00077-CAP) [hereinafter Com-
plaint]. 
 31 Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 32 Id. 
 33 Complaint, supra note 30, at 3; Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1299. 
 34 Barnes, 669 F.3d at 1299. 
 35 Complaint, supra note 30, at 11–12. 
 36 Id. at 12. 
 37 Id. at 13. 
 38 Id. at 13–14. 
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book page and seized upon the opportunity he perceived in the col-
lage, which included pictures of Zaccari, a parking deck, and the 
caption “S.A.V.E.—Zaccari Memorial Parking Garage.”39 
Internal documents and depositions obtained during the course 
of the subsequent civil rights litigation filed by Barnes in January 
2008 indicate that Zaccari was repeatedly told by senior VSU offi-
cials that Barnes did not present a threat to himself, others, or the 
campus.40 Nevertheless, Zaccari personally ordered that Barnes be 
“administratively withdraw[n]” from campus—i.e., expelled.41 
Barnes was notified of his expulsion by a letter slipped under his 
dormitory door.42 Signed by Zaccari and attached to a print out of 
Barnes’ Facebook collage, the letter informed Barnes that because 
of “recent activities directed towards me by you,” including “the at-
tached threatening document,” Barnes was “considered to present a 
clear and present danger to this campus.”43 Barnes’ expulsion was 
effective immediately, and if he sought readmission, he would be 
required to present proof from a psychiatrist that he did not present 
“a danger to [himself] or others” and to receive therapy while en-
rolled at VSU.44 
                                                                                                             
 39 Id. at 10, 13–14. 
 40 Barnes v. Zaccari, 669 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 2012) (“Over the 
next two weeks, Zaccari convened no less than five meetings about Barnes. At 
these meetings, Zaccari characterized Barnes’s behavior as threatening. No one 
on his staff agreed with his assessment. Two mental health professionals, McMil-
lan and the Director of the VSU counseling center, Dr. Victor Morgan, repeatedly 
told Zaccari that Barnes was not a threat to himself or others. Other university 
officials agreed among themselves that Zaccari was overreacting. . . . Zaccari ex-
plored several other avenues to remove Barnes from campus. These included a 
mental health withdrawal and a disorderly conduct charge. VSU’s mental health 
withdrawal policy requires a mental health professional to recommend that the 
student be withdrawn because he or she represents a danger to himself or others. 
This policy guarantees the student an informal hearing before the withdrawal and 
the opportunity to present pertinent evidence on his behalf. Zaccari’s staff con-
sistently said this policy did not apply to Barnes because he was not a threat. Zac-
cari also looked into bringing a disorderly conduct charge against Barnes under 
the VSU Student Code of Conduct. But this charge also requires a hearing where 
the student can present evidence on his behalf. Zaccari ultimately rejected these 
options as too ‘cumbersome.’” (citations omitted) (footnotes omitted)). 
 41 Id. at 1301. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Id. 
 44 Id. 
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After being expelled, Barnes appealed the decision to the Board 
of Regents for the University System of Georgia.45 Despite produc-
ing the required certification from a psychiatrist, the Board did not 
reverse Barnes’ expulsion until January 17, 2008—a week after he 
filed suit in federal court alleging a violation of his rights to free 
speech and due process, among other claims.46 In July 2012, the 
Eleventh Circuit held that Zaccari could not avail himself of quali-
fied immunity because he ignored Barnes’ “clearly established con-
stitutional right to notice and a hearing before being removed from 
VSU.”47 In January 2015, the Eleventh Circuit again found in 
Barnes’ favor, ruling that his First Amendment retaliation claim 
against Zaccari had been improperly dismissed by the federal dis-
trict court.48 In July 2015, the lawsuit concluded with the announce-
ment of a $900,000 settlement payment to Barnes.49 
B. Young Conservatives of Texas, Lone Star College–Tomball 
In September 2008, the Young Conservatives of Texas (“YCT”), 
a registered student organization at Lone Star College–Tomball in 
Texas, distributed flyers during a “club rush” event where organiza-
tions recruit new student members and increase awareness of their 
presence on campus.50 Adorned by the club’s logo, the flyers read: 
Top Ten Gun Safety Tips 
10. Always keep your gun pointed in a safe direction, 
such as at a Hippy or a Communist. 
9. Dumb children might get a hold of your guns and 
shoot each other. If your children are dumb, put them 
up for adoption to protect your guns. 
                                                                                                             
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. at 1301–02. 
 47 Id. at 1309. 
 48 Barnes v. Zaccari, 592 F. App’x 859, 868 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 49 Settlement Agreement and General Release at 2, Barnes v. Zaccari, (No. 
7:12-cv-0089-HL), https://www.thefire.org/settlement-agreement-in-barnes-v-za
ccari-et-al. 
 50 “Top Ten Gun Safety Tips” Censored at Lone Star College in Texas, 
FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Oct. 20, 2008), https://www.thefire.
org/top-ten-gun-safety-tips-censored-at-lone-star-college-in-texas-2. 
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8. No matter how responsible he seems, never give 
your gun to a monkey 
7. If guns make you nervous, drink a bottle of whis-
key before heading to the range 
6. While unholstering your weapon, it’s customary to 
say “Excuse me while I whip this out.” 
5. Don’t load your gun unless you are ready to shoot 
something or are just feeling generally angry. 
4. If your gun misfires, never look down the barrel to 
inspect it. 
3. Never us[e] your gun to pistol whip someone. That 
could mar the finish. 
2. No matter how excited you are about buying your 
first gun, do not run around yelling “I have a gun! I 
have a gun!” 
1. And the most important rule of gun safety: Don’t 
piss me off. 
Join us for an informational meeting Monday, 
September 15th at 4 p.m. in the commons area. 
If you have any questions or would like to join 
please contact either Rob Comer (President) at 
832-372-7192 or Joshua Pantano (VP) at 281-352-
8088.51 
Shannon Marino, the college’s program manager for student ac-
tivities, informed YCT President Robert Comer that the flyers were 
“inappropriate” and confiscated them.52 After Comer complained 
about the violation of his expressive rights, he was invited to speak 
                                                                                                             
 51 Letter from Adam Kissel, Dir., Individual Rights Def. Program, to Dr. Ray-
mond Hawkins, President, Lone Star Coll.–Tomball (Sept. 26, 2008), https://
www.thefire.org/fire-letter-to-lone-star-college-tomball-president-raymond-
hawkins. 
 52 “Top Ten Gun Safety Tips” Censored at Lone Star College in Texas, supra 
note 50. 
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with Dean of Student Development E. Edward Albracht.53 Refer-
encing the 2007 mass shooting at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and 
State University (“Virginia Tech”), Albracht agreed with Marino 
that the flyers were inappropriate.54 Later that week, Marino in-
formed Comer that the college’s attorneys were reviewing the flyers 
to determine if the organization would be allowed to retain official 
recognition.55 She told Comer that the organization would likely be 
placed on “probation” for the school year because of the flyer.56 
FIRE wrote to remind the college of its First Amendment obli-
gations, pointing out that the flyer’s text was plainly protected 
speech: 
Equally troubling is Albracht’s invocation of the Vir-
ginia Tech shootings as a reason to ban satirical ma-
terial that refers to guns or gun violence. The First 
Amendment does permit the prohibition of “true 
threats,” which the Supreme Court has held are 
“those statements where the speaker means to com-
municate a serious expression of an intent to commit 
an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual 
or group of individuals.” Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 
343, 359 (2003). The plainly unserious “Top Ten” 
list expresses no such intent.57 
In response, the college’s general counsel replied that “[t]he 
mention of firearms and weapons on college campuses” is inher-
ently a “material interference with the operation of the school or the 
rights of others” because such language “brings fear and concern to 
students, faculty and staff.”58 Continuing, he argued that “the trag-
edy of Virginia Tech cannot be underestimated when it comes to 
                                                                                                             
 53 See id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 See id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Letter from Adam Kissel to Dr. Raymond Hawkins, supra note 51. 
 58 See E-mail from Brian S. Nelson, Gen. Counsel, Lone Star Coll. Sys. to 
Adam Kissel, Dir., Individual Rights Def. Program, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL 
RIGHTS IN EDUC. (Oct. 14, 2008, 11:58 PM), http://www.thefire.org/index.php/ 
article/9815.html. 
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speech relating to firearms—however ‘satirical and humorous’ the 
speech may be perceived by some.”59 
C. Professor Francis Schmidt, Bergen Community College 
In January 2014, Bergen Community College (“BCC”) profes-
sor Francis Schmidt posted a picture of his daughter in a yoga pose 
on his Google+ page.60 In the picture, his daughter wears a T-shirt 
emblazoned with “I will take what is mine with fire & blood,” a 
phrase from the popular HBO television series “Game of 
Thrones.”61 Schmidt’s post was automatically sent, via email, to 
those in his Google+ “circles”—including a BCC dean, who re-
ported it to other administrators as a possible threat.62 
Following the dean’s report, Schmidt was summoned to a meet-
ing with senior BCC administrators, including a college security of-
ficer, to explain his “threatening email.”63 Inside Higher Ed reported 
that at the meeting, Schmidt was asked by BCC’s executive director 
for human resources about the phrase on his daughter’s T-shirt, and, 
in apparent disbelief, asked Schmidt to Google the phrase.64 When 
the search returned roughly 4 million matches in reference to the 
show, Schmidt asked how it could have sparked such a dispropor-
tionate response.65 In reply, the security officer told Schmidt “that 
‘fire’ could be a kind of proxy for ‘AK-47s.’”66 
Despite Schmidt’s explanation and the subsequent verification 
of the context of the phrase via the search engine results, Schmidt 
was informed in an email sent after the meeting that he was being 
disciplined for the post.67 He was immediately placed on leave with-
out pay and was required to undergo a psychiatric evaluation before 
                                                                                                             
 59 Id. 
 60 Greg Lukianoff, ‘Game of Thrones’ Quote Deemed Too Threatening for 
NJ Community College, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 17, 2014), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/greg-lukianoff/game-of-thrones-quote-dee_b_5168111.html. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Colleen Flaherty, Jersey Impasse, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Apr. 16, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/04/16/bergen-community-college-
faculty-and-president-conflict-over-many-issues. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Id. 
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being allowed to return to campus.68 Upon his return, BCC used the 
fact of the discipline to justify placing onerous restrictions on 
Schmidt’s expression moving forward.69 An official reprimand was 
added to his personnel file, and Schmidt was warned that he would 
be subject to “suspension and/or termination” for making “dispar-
aging” remarks about the institution or otherwise acted in a way 
BCC administrators deemed “unbecoming.”70 
Schmidt’s suspension may be placed in context by reference to 
his relationship to the institution.71 Schmidt was an active member 
in the faculty union, which issued a vote of no-confidence in college 
leadership in April 2014, following Schmidt’s discipline.72 At the 
time of Schmidt’s discipline in January 2014, the faculty union had 
been working without a contract for nearly six months.73 A week 
before posting the photo, Schmidt had filed a grievance against the 
college, complaining that he had been denied a sabbatical and alleg-
ing unfair employment practices.74 Schmidt believed he was tar-
geted as a result of his participation in debates concerning the union 
and the administration.75 
FIRE issued a national press release alerting the media to 
Schmidt’s ordeal76 and secured Schmidt the assistance of counsel.77 
Facing the prospect of a First Amendment lawsuit, BCC cleared the 
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warning and reprimand from Schmidt’s file in September 2014.78 In 
a letter to Schmidt, BCC admitted that Schmidt’s punishment “may 
have lacked basis” and “potentially violated” the First Amendment: 
“Lest there be any doubt, BCC recognizes and respects that you are 
free to exercise your constitutional rights, including your right to 
freedom of speech and expression, even to the extent that you may 
disparage BCC and/or its officials.”79 The letter confirmed that mov-
ing forward, Schmidt would “be in good standing with BCC as if 
the Incident never occurred, and BCC’s records shall so reflect.”80 
D. Professor James Miller, University of Wisconsin–Stout 
In September 2011, Professor James Miller of the University of 
Wisconsin–Stout affixed a homemade poster near his office door.81 
The poster included a picture of the actor Nathan Fillion in his role 
as Captain Malcolm Reynolds in the science-fiction television series 
Firefly, and a line from the character: “You don’t know me, son, so 
let me explain this to you once: If I ever kill you, you’ll be awake. 
You’ll be facing me. And you’ll be armed.”82 
A few days after the poster was hung, Stout’s chief of police, 
Lisa A. Walter, removed it and informed Miller via email that she 
had done so because the text “refer[red] to killing.”83 In reply, Miller 
asked that Walter “respect [his] first amendment rights,” to which 
Walter responded that “the poster [could] be interpreted as a 
threat.”84 Walter told Miller that he could face criminal charges for 
“disorderly conduct” for reposting the poster or related posters in 
the future.85 
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Feeling challenged by Walter’s warning, Miller soon put up a 
new poster on his office door.86 Marked by an image of a stick-fig-
ure police officer beating someone with a baton, the new poster 
stated: “Warning: Fascism. Fascism can cause blunt head trauma 
and/or violent death. Keep fascism away from children and pets.”87 
Walter removed this poster as well, telling Miller via email that the 
poster had been taken down for presenting a “threat,” as it “de-
pict[ed] violence and mention[ed] violence and death.”88 Walter fur-
ther informed Miller that the decision to take down the poster had 
been made by the university’s “threat assessment team.”89 A dean 
of the college scheduled a meeting with Miller soon thereafter to 
discuss “the concerns raised by the campus threat assessment 
team.”90 
Concerned, Miller contacted FIRE, which in turn contacted 
Stout Chancellor Charles W. Sorensen.91 FIRE explained that the 
posters did not constitute a true threat, nor would they cause a rea-
sonable person to predict a disruption of the educational environ-
ment.92 Sorensen did not reply, but instead defended Walter’s treat-
ment of Miller in an email to all faculty and staff.93 FIRE issued a 
press release expressing deep concern about the threat to free ex-
pression and academic freedom presented by the Stout administra-
tion’s failure to rectify Miller’s treatment.94 In response, many Fire-
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fly fans wrote to Sorensen to complain about the university’s ac-
tions.95 The incident attracted national media attention and state-
ments of support from Firefly cast members and author Neil 
Gaiman.96 Under scrutiny, Stout administrators announced that the 
university had abandoned its case against Miller, would handle sim-
ilar cases differently moving forward, and would plan First Amend-
ment workshops to be held in the future.97 
E. Professor Hyung-il Jung, University of Central Florida 
In April 2013, Professor Hyung-il Jung of the University of Cen-
tral Florida (“UCF”) was teaching an accounting class in preparation 
for an upcoming exam.98 As the students tired of the exam review 
work, the Orlando Sentinel reported that Jung stated: “This question 
is very difficult. It looks like you guys are being slowly suffocated 
by these questions. Am I on a killing spree or what?”99 A student in 
the classroom reported the remark to UCF administrators.100 
In response, Jung was placed on administrative leave in an offi-
cial letter of reprimand.101 During that time, UCF informed him that 
he was barred from “all . . . university duties,” was not allowed to 
enter campus, and was forbidden from “contact of any nature, with 
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any students, for any reason.”102 UCF further notified Jung that he 
would be required to undergo a “thorough mental health evaluation” 
and produce a statement from a mental health professional certifying 
that he did not present a “threat to [himself] or to the university com-
munity.”103 The Sentinel reported that while UCF police investi-
gated the “threat,” twenty of Jung’s students sent a letter to the ad-
ministration complaining about Jung’s punishment and pointing out 
that the statement was intended to be a joke and was generally re-
ceived as such.104 
FIRE wrote to UCF in Jung’s defense, making clear that his 
statement did not constitute a threat and could not reasonably be 
taken as such.105 Days later, UCF notified Jung that he would no 
longer need to undergo a mental health evaluation.106 Jung was re-
instated after three weeks.107 
F. Professor Tim McGettigan, Colorado State University–Pueblo 
In January 2014, Professor Tim McGettigan of Colorado State 
University–Pueblo sent an email to students and faculty comparing 
impending staff cuts to the Ludlow Massacre, a 1914 incident in-
volving the massacre of striking coal miners in Ludlow, Colo-
rado.108 McGettigan, an outspoken critic of the administration, en-
couraged students to protest the possibility of the loss of fifty Colo-
rado State University (“CSU”) staffers, announced by CSU–Pueblo 
President Lesley Di Mare in December 2013, and likened the impact 
of the layoffs to the 1914 massacre.109 
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In response, the administration found McGettigan in violation of 
university policy prohibiting the “[u]se of electronic communica-
tions to intimidate, threaten, or harass other individuals.”110 McGet-
tigan’s email access was immediately suspended.111 Asked by Inside 
Higher Ed about the punishment, Di Mare invoked the specter of 
school shootings: 
Considering the lessons we’ve all learned from Col-
umbine, Virginia Tech, and more recently Arapahoe 
High School, I can only say that the security of our 
students, faculty, and staff are our top priority . . . 
CSU–Pueblo is facing some budget challenges right 
now, which has sparked impassioned criticism and 
debate across our campus community. That’s en-
tirely appropriate, and everyone on campus—no 
matter how you feel about the challenges at hand—
should be able to engage in that activity in an envi-
ronment that is free of intimidation, harassment, and 
threats.112 
In a letter to President Di Mare, FIRE noted that McGettigan’s 
email did not constitute unprotected speech and could not reasona-
bly be deemed a threat, intimidation, or harassment.113 Even though 
the institution’s general counsel responded that McGettigan’s First 
Amendment rights had not been violated, McGettigan’s email ac-
cess was partially restored soon thereafter.114 In January 2015, 
McGettigan filed a federal lawsuit against the university, arguing 
that the punishment and a subsequent revocation of a previously 
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granted sabbatical constituted retaliation.115 The lawsuit is ongo-
ing.116 
G. Professor Chester Kulis, Oakton Community College 
In May 2015, Professor Chester Kulis of Oakton Community 
College (“OCC”) sent an email to colleagues and staff that read: 
“Have a happy MAY DAY when workers across the world celebrate 
their struggle for union rights and remember the Haymarket riot in 
Chicago.”117 Kulis, an adjunct faculty member and a frequent advo-
cate for adjunct faculty organizing, referenced the 1886 Haymarket 
Riot and International Workers’ Day in part to signify his opposition 
to policies enacted by OCC President Margaret B. Lee, who was one 
of many OCC faculty and staff to receive the email.118 Kulis’ email 
was titled “May Day – The Antidote to the Peg Lee Gala,” in refer-
ence to a forthcoming event hosted by OCC to celebrate Lee’s im-
pending retirement.119 
Days after sending the email, Philip H. Gerner III, OCC’s gen-
eral counsel, sent Kulis a letter warning that any similar communi-
cations in the future would result in legal action.120 Because the Hay-
market Riot “involved a bomb-throwing incident at a striking work-
ers’ rally in Chicago which resulted in 11 deaths and more than 70 
people injured,” Gerner wrote to Kulis, “[y]our reference to ‘re-
member the Haymarket riot’ was clearly threatening the President 
that you could resort to violence against the President and the Col-
lege campus.”121 
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FIRE wrote OCC administrators, asking the college to disavow 
the letter and rescind any threat of legal action against Kulis on the 
basis of his email.122 FIRE’s letter explained: 
Kulis’s brief email is entirely protected by the First 
Amendment, and the charge that it was “clearly 
threatening” to anyone in the OCC community is 
without merit and wholly detached from our legal 
system’s understanding of what constitutes a true 
threat. . . . Kulis’s email invoking a historical event 
in the context of his ongoing labor activism cannot 
by any reasonable reading be considered threatening 
or intimidating in this regard.123 
Despite the clarity of the legal precedent, OCC’s lawyers reiter-
ated their assertion that Kulis’ email constituted a true threat.124 In 
response to FIRE, OCC’s attorneys claimed that because Lee was 
one of the recipients of Kulis’ email, “she interpreted the communi-
cation as a threat against her personally.”125 
H. Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, United States Court of 
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
In February 2016, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in the 
case of Bell v. Itawamba County School Board, leaving in place an 
en banc decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit that essentially condoned the use of a broader definition of 
“threat” in the context of high school students’ speech.126 The Fifth 
Circuit’s decision and the Supreme Court’s failure to review and 
overturn it leave students particularly vulnerable to punishment for 
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constitutionally protected expression under the guise that it is threat-
ening. 
Bell v. Itawamba centers on a rap recording that plaintiff Taylor 
Bell created and uploaded to Facebook and YouTube in January 
2011.127 Bell’s lyrics alleged sexual misconduct by two coaches at 
his school and contained what the Fifth Circuit described as “at least 
four instances of threatening, harassing, and intimidating language 
against the two coaches”:128 
1. “betta watch your back / I’m a serve this nigga, 
like I serve the junkies with some crack”; 
2. “Run up on T-Bizzle / I’m going to hit you with 
my rueger”; 
3. “you fucking with the wrong one / going to get a 
pistol down your mouth / Boww”; and 
4. “middle fingers up if you want to cap that nigga / 
middle fingers up / he get no mercy nigga”.129 
Bell explained in his disciplinary hearing that his intention was 
to “increase awareness of the situation”—that is, the coaches’ al-
leged misconduct—not to threaten the coaches.130 Nevertheless, he 
was suspended for seven days, banned from school functions, and 
placed in an alternative school for the remaining six weeks of the 
grading period.131 On appeal, the school board affirmed that Bell had 
“threatened, harassed, and intimidated school employees.”132 
Bell filed suit against the school board, alleging it had violated 
his right to free expression under the First Amendment.133 The dis-
trict court found for the school board, reasoning that because school 
officials could reasonably foresee the lyrics causing disruption at 
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Bell’s school, they could lawfully punish Bell under Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent Community School District, even though the 
speech occurred outside of school.134 
The district court agreed with the school board that Bell’s lyrics 
were threatening, but it also emphasized the idea that students’ opin-
ions of the coaches would change in light of Bell’s allegations—thus 
creating a disturbance.135 One coach “perceived that students were 
wary of him,” while another “testified that his teaching style has also 
been adversely affected out of fear students suspect him of inappro-
priate behavior.”136 In other words, the fact that Bell discussed such 
serious matters of public concern effectively gave the court an ex-
cuse to avoid a careful analysis of whether Bell’s speech constitutes 
a true threat under Watts and Black. This is precisely the opposite of 
how First Amendment protections should apply; matters of public 
concern should be, if anything, more strongly protected.137 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 
the lower court’s decision, acknowledging that “hyperbolic and vi-
olent language is a commonly used narrative device in rap, which 
functions to convey emotion and meaning—not to make real threats 
of violence.”138 The court also rejected the contention that the 
coaches’ having to take special care to avoid suspicion constituted 
disruption as contemplated by Tinker.139 
In August 2015, however, the case was reheard by the Fifth Cir-
cuit en banc, resulting in another finding for the school board.140 The 
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court found that “off-campus speech directed intentionally at the 
school community and reasonably understood by school officials to 
be threatening, harassing, and intimidating to a teacher” was not pro-
tected speech,141 that Bell intended for students to hear his rap,142 
and that his lyrics constituted threats “as a layperson would under-
stand the term.”143 It stated that it was “unnecessary to decide 
whether Bell’s speech also constitute[d] a ‘true threat’ under 
Watts.”144 
In contrast, the dissenting judges criticized the majority’s “deci-
sion to proclaim an entirely new, content-based restriction on stu-
dents’ First Amendment rights,” which applies to speech that falls 
short of “true threats” but “that its invented layperson might con-
sider ‘threatening,’ ‘harassing,’ or ‘intimidating.’”145 A layperson’s 
sense of what constitutes a threat—like his sense of what constitutes 
obscenity or fighting words, for example—may be far broader than 
what the Supreme Court has defined as punishable threats.146 
While the court rests its holding on Tinker, a case involving high 
school and junior high school students, many courts have errone-
ously extended the holdings of high school cases to college cases.147 
Therefore, this intrusion into Bell’s First Amendment rights threat-
ens freedom of expression not only for secondary school students 
but also for college students, who are overwhelmingly adults and 
should enjoy full First Amendment protection on public college 
campuses. 
I. Yik Yak, University of Mary Washington 
Campus community members’ concerns over threats have 
prompted a focus on anonymous speech, particularly anonymous so-
cial media like the smartphone application Yik Yak.148 In 2015, stu-
dents at the University of Mary Washington (“UMW”) requested 
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that the university attempt to block the app on campus in response 
to so-called threats,149 but the context of their requests revealed a 
failure to distinguish between true threats that warrant police in-
volvement and insults that may not be punished by a public institu-
tion such as UMW.150 
The controversy at UMW began in the Fall of 2014, when stu-
dents posted critical and strongly worded remarks on Yik Yak in 
response to advocacy by the then-president of the student group 
Feminists United on Campus (“FUC”).151 In November 2014, a 
small number of members of the university’s men’s rugby club were 
recorded at an off-campus party singing a song with lyrics that some 
found objectionable.152 Though critics of the chant characterized it 
as “advocat[ing] violence against women,” the song purported to be 
a cautionary tale against having sex with a dead prostitute.153 Sub-
sequently, FUC complained about the chant to the university.154 De-
spite the fact that most rugby club members did not attend the party 
and that most at the party were not men’s rugby club                        
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members, UMW dissolved the entire men’s rugby club in March 
2015.155 Criticism of FUC on Yik Yak and in other forums report-
edly intensified thereafter.156 
The university president published a statement saying that 
“[u]niversity policies prohibit discrimination, harassment, threats, 
and derogatory statements of any form.”157 The First Amendment 
prohibits UMW from punishing statements that are simply “derog-
atory” with no determination that they fall into an unprotected cate-
gory of speech such as true threats, but this statement set the stage 
for students to demand an institutional response to constitutionally 
protected speech.158 
In its complaint to the Department of Education’s Office for 
Civil Rights (“OCR”),159 FUC alleged that in violation of Title IX, 
UMW failed to take sufficient steps to eliminate a hostile environ-
ment created by students posting negative messages about FUC on 
Yik Yak.160 
FUC alleged that its members had “been threatened hundreds of 
times.”161 Yet the supposedly threatening messages ranged from pop 
culture references to profane but plainly protected insults—they 
were not “serious expression[s] of an intent to commit an act of un-
lawful violence.”162 For example, the complaint alleged FUC mem-
bers were described as “femicunts, feminazis, cunts, bitches, hoes, 
and dikes.”163 One individual rhetorically asked, “Can we euthanize 
whoever caused this bullshit?”164 Another referenced a sketch by 
comedy troupe The Whitest Kids U’ Know, writing: “Gonna tie 
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these feminists to the radiator and [g]rape [sic] them in the 
mouth.”165 
Of those in FUC’s complaint, the statement that most arguably 
constitutes a true threat read: “Dandy’s about to kill a bitch . . . or 
two.”166 But as in Virginia v. Black, even this statement must be 
considered along with “all of the contextual factors that are neces-
sary to decide whether” the remark was meant to communicate a 
true threat or intimidation.167 
UMW declined FUC’s “request[] that the administration . . . ad-
dress the problem with Yik Yak [by] having the app disabled at 
UMW or banning Yik Yak from the school Wi-Fi.”168 UMW Presi-
dent Richard Hurley explained: “[A]s a public university, UMW is 
obligated to comply with all federal laws—not just Title IX. The 
First Amendment prohibits prior restraints on speech, and banning 
Yik Yak is tantamount to a content-based prohibition on speech.”169 
FUC then amended its complaint, arguing that Hurley’s defense of 
UMW was “disparaging” and constituted prohibited retaliation.170 
OCR said it would investigate the allegations in the original com-
plaint as well as the additional allegation against Hurley.171 
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Investigations like this incentivize institutions to take action 
against students expressing themselves based on bare accusations, 
with no real determination of whether the expression at issue con-
stitutes “true threats” or other unprotected speech. 
In contrast, several incidents involving actual threats via Yik 
Yak on college campuses have ended in cooperation between Yik 
Yak administrators and law enforcement, leading to an arrest of the 
individuals making the threats. A student at Oklahoma State Uni-
versity, for example, was arrested in April 2015 in connection with 
a “Yak” that read: “School shooting on campus this Friday. You 
have been warned.”172 A former Pennsylvania State University stu-
dent was sentenced in May 2015 to jail time after posting on Yik 
Yak, “I am going to kill everyone in Penn State main on Mon-
day.”173 An Emory University student was arrested in October 2015 
after police concluded she posted, “I’m shooting up the school. To-
morrow. Stay in your rooms. The ones on the quad are the ones who 
will go first.”174 In the same month, a Texas A&M student was ar-
rested because he allegedly posted on Yik Yak, “THIS IS NOT A 
JOKE! DON’T GO TO CAMPUS BETWEEN 7 AND 730 THIS 
WILL BE MY ONLY WARNING.”175 Many more students have 
been arrested on suspicion of similar threats.176 
These cases stand as examples both of the kind of language that 
can be punished as a true threat and of the fact that in cases where 
students’ safety is truly at risk, police can obtain the information 
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necessary to take action against the perpetrator without limiting the 
expression of students who have done nothing wrong. 
J. Daniel Perrone, St. John’s University 
In 2015, St. John’s University student Daniel Perrone wrote a 
work of fiction about a school shooting for a class titled “Graduate 
Fiction Workshop: The Monstrous.”177 The university reported him 
to the police.178 Perrone was ultimately cleared of wrongdoing by 
the New York Police Department.179 But St. John’s decision to sub-
ject a student to a police investigation and several hours of question-
ing, despite the fact that the work was plainly fiction within the 
scope of the class and the assignment, risks chilling a substantial 
amount of student speech. 
A coalition of free speech organizations, led by the New York 
Civil Liberties Union and including FIRE, wrote to St. John’s in 
April 2016 asking the university to publish a policy that clearly pro-
tects student fiction writers from similar repercussions.180 St. John’s 
had previously declined to take this step upon request from Perrone 
himself.181 Without such a policy, students and faculty will be forced 
to choose between avoiding all topics that might be disturbing—
even if exploring hypotheticals and made-up worlds—or potentially 
being the target of a police interrogation.182 The risk of being re-
ported simply for a serious response to a class assignment is incom-
patible with St. John’s assertion that it is “committed to standards 
promoting speech and expression that foster the responsible ex-
change of ideas and opinions which enables the pursuit of 
knowledge and truth.”183 Although St. John’s is not bound by the 
First Amendment, it is legally and morally obligated to uphold the 
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promises it makes to its students.184 The university’s response also 
runs contrary to common sense and the very purpose of a fiction-
writing class, particularly given that Perrone’s piece even “included 
a disclaimer at the outset that its contents do not reflect the intentions 
of the author.”185 
The coalition letter explained to St. John’s that “[s]ome of the 
greatest writings in literature, from Vladimir Nabokov to Edgar Al-
lan Poe to Toni Morrison to Cormac McCarthy have the capacity to 
be deeply disturbing.”186 Further, “because we live in difficult times 
it is even more important for schools to have clear, transparent pol-
icies that respect the difference between threats to campus security 
and creative writing.”187 Finally, the letter observed that “[c]reative 
writing programs around the country, including those that have ex-
perienced tragedies like Virginia Tech,” have instituted policies that 
properly make that distinction, allowing students to “be free to ex-
plore the various themes of our modern lives, including the truly 
disturbing and tragic ones, in their creative writing without fear of a 
police encounter.”188 
III. PROBLEMS PRESENTED AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
A review of representative examples of student and faculty 
speech mislabeled as threats indicates that an administrative desire 
to silence criticism or opposition is a common motivation for this 
type of censorship.189 Equally common are obvious misrepresenta-
tions of the content of speech at issue, or an apparent disregard for 
obvious contextual factors that would mitigate the speech’s content. 
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At times, students, professors, and administrators have even aban-
doned legal, moral, and practical obligations to protect expression 
in order to simply avoid discomfort.190 
Whatever the cause, the problem is serious: Misclassifying pro-
tected student and faculty speech as threats threatens the First 
Amendment, teaches students and faculty the wrong lesson about 
their rights on campus, betrays the purpose of higher education, triv-
ializes real harms, and produces a chilling effect on the speech of 
others. 
Given the fact that these misclassifications subvert applicable 
legal doctrine, targeted lawsuits in defense of silenced students and 
faculty may be necessary in order to reset the incentives administra-
tors currently face. Repeated denials of qualified immunity to ad-
ministrative censors in a series of lawsuits might impact the risk 
management calculus undertaken by administrators, their counsel, 
and institutional insurers in such a way that the protection of student 
and faculty speech rights would trump other competing interests. 
Moreover, such denials of qualified immunity would be especially 
appropriate in cases arising out of student speech like that of Hayden 
Barnes, Young Conservatives of Texas, or Daniel Perrone—speech 
that could not reasonably be interpreted as “a serious expression of 
an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular indi-
vidual or group of individuals.”191 
While lawsuits may be necessary to motivate administrators at 
many institutions to protect free speech, precise and carefully 
crafted policies are necessary to maintain any freedoms that are 
won. As demonstrated by cases like Bell v. Itawamba, though the 
Supreme Court has enumerated specific categories of unprotected 
speech, including threats, a layperson’s guess at what each of those 
labels includes is likely not to line up with what a public institution 
may legally punish under the First Amendment.192 It is not sufficient 
to prohibit undefined or amorphous categories of potentially harm-
ful expression and then rely on every current and future administra-
tor to fairly and evenly apply school policy. Instead, college policies 
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should prohibit unprotected categories of speech and define them 
with boundaries that mirror those established by the Supreme Court. 
Unfortunately, administrative efforts to censor are often 
prompted or facilitated by student calls for censorship like those at 
the University of Mary Washington.193 Accordingly, a critical ele-
ment of minimizing overreactions to non-threatening speech is 
teaching campus communities about both the legal options that al-
ready exist to address real threats and the harmful practical results 
of “crying wolf.” As demonstrated by the cases where students 
threatened violence on campus via Yik Yak, law enforcement is em-
powered to take more effective steps than campus administrators 
can to keep students safe.194 After all, a suspension will not keep a 
potential shooter from campus—a prison sentence will. The fact that 
law enforcement is so often not called in despite supposed threats to 
safety suggests that administrators’ citing to these concerns as justi-
fication for censorship is, at least in some cases, disingenuous. 
Additionally, if overzealous administrators continue to punish 
protected speech under the guise of responding to threats, students 
will increasingly find themselves less informed about issues that are 
highly relevant to them, such as Taylor Bell’s allegations of wrong-
doing by his high school’s coaches. Campus community members 
will not hear warnings meant to prevent history from repeating, as 
all references to past tragedies will be interpreted as an intent to 
reenact them—as was the case with Professors Tim McGettigan and 
Chester Kulis.195 Even commemorative sentiments like “Never for-
get September 11th” may not be safe. 
At the same time, students will be dissuaded from being out-
spoken on the issues that they are most passionate about, lest their 
passion cross an unarticulated line determined by administrators’ 
whims.196 Such a result is harmful to students’ sense of civic respon-
sibility and harmful to any well-functioning democracy. Students 
will also be left without opportunities to receive professional feed-
back on projects that explore upsetting ideas or push the envelope 
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as long as they are burdened with the fear that doing so may prompt 
their institutions to react as St. John’s did, by involving the police.197 
Students and professors who value students’ personal and intel-
lectual development must demand unfettered discourse at their in-
stitutions. With moral pressure from free speech advocates and legal 
and financial pressure from courts, public institutions and private 
institutions that have advertised themselves as bastions of free 
speech will have little choice but to uphold First Amendment prin-
ciples and enact policies that allow the institution to respond effec-
tively to true threats while fully protecting students’ rights. 
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